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NOTE

A PRESCRIPTION FOR EXCESS:
USING PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY TO LIMIT
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States aggressively pursues antitrust violations
perpetrated by foreign defendants.' Of the fines collected by the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") for Sherman Act violations, eighteen of
the twenty largest fines have been levied against foreign corporations.2
Private plaintiffs, too, are able to bring private rights of action against
foreign corporations under the Sherman Act.3 Courts adjudicate these
matters involving wholly foreign conduct and parties by applying the
Sherman Act extraterritorially. 4
The extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act has vexed courts
for decades.5 There has been sharp disagreement among jurists as to how
U.S. courts ought to apply U.S. antitrust laws abroad.6 As a general
1. See 2010 Year-End Criminal Antitrust Update, GIBSON DUNN 1, 3 (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/201 OYear-EndCriminal/AntitrustUpdate.pdf
(indicating that in 2010, for example, the United States assessed a large number of international
antitrust fines).
2. ANTITRUST DIv., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS YIELDING ACORPORATE
FINE OF $10 MILLION OR MORE 1-2 (2012) [hereinafter SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/shermanlO.html.
3. See infra text accompanying note 22.
4. See infra Part l.C.
5. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909) (finding it
"startling" that a plaintiff would seek relief for something occurring internationally); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976) (describing how international law
does not provide strict guidance on the application of the Sherman Act extraterritorially and absence
of such guidance from the Sherman Act itself); James S. McNeill, Comment, Extraterritorial
Antitrust Jurisdiction:Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, andJurisdiction,28 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 425, 431 (1998) ("Since the [Sherman] Act's enactment, courts have struggled with determining
just where jurisdiction begins and ends when foreign commerce is involved. The result is a
hodgepodge of judicially constructed tests and factors.").
6. Compare Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (finding that
international comity concerns are not always implicated by an extraterritorial application of law),
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matter, the Sherman Act can apply extraterritorially to foreign conduct if
that conduct produces substantial effects inside the United States.7 The
Supreme Court has established judicial rules about the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act that do not provide predictive guidance
or protection for foreign defendants. The result is that foreign
defendants cannot know with sufficient certainty whether their wholly
foreign actions will lead either to a civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution
in U.S. courts. 9 Further, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act has negatively impacted foreign relations between the United States
and its closest trading partners.10
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the problems caused by the
expansive extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act and to propose
that courts must apply the principles of prescriptive comity when
analyzing the Sherman Act's application to foreign conduct. Courts
would employ two different comity analyses depending on whether
conduct is illegal in only the United States or illegal in both the United
States and the country where the conduct occurred.11 If conduct is legal
in the foreign jurisdiction where it occurred, courts would employ a
comity analysis that looks to the degree of regulation that the foreign
nation imposes on the industry in which the allegedly anticompetitive
conduct occurs. 12 When conduct is illegal in both nations, the court
would use prescriptive comity by looking for consent or implied consent
from the other nation and by ensuring 13that an exercise ofjurisdiction will
not impede upon diplomatic relations.

with id. at 817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating the use of prescriptive comity to limit the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws).
7. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (concluding
that both agreements at issue were unlawful, even though made abroad, because they affected the
imports in the United States).
8. See, e.g., HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 799 (providing that no conflict of law exists when a
defendant can comply with two sovereigns' laws even if those laws are different).
9.

MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONLISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 194 (2003); see

Brief for the Gov't of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 13, United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001) (discussing the difficulty in anticipating
whether conduct in one nation will lead to the application of another nation's laws); see also

Jonathan M. Rich & Greta L. Burkholder, Third Circuit Eases Burden on Foreign Injury Antitrust
Plaintiffs, MORGAN LEWIS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfin/fuseaction/
publication.detail/publicationD/2a5dga27-5a84-4b08-866e-e03199550blI
(describing how the
burden is becoming lower on plaintiffs in antitrust cases involving foreign conduct).
10. See infra Part III.D.
11. See infra Part lV.B.
12. See infra Part 1V.B.1.
13. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Part II of this Note discusses how the Sherman Act came to apply
extraterritorially. Part III shows the problems caused by the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, especially the negative
impact on international relations. Part IV discusses how to use comity,
defined in the context of Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Hartford
FireInsurance Co. v. California,14 when courts decide whether to apply
the Sherman Act extraterritorially.
II.

THE SHERMAN ACT'S SHIFT FROM STRICTLY TERRITORIAL
APPLICATION TO EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

The extraterritorial application of U.S. laws varies among the courts
and depends on the type of substantive law at issue. 15 Circuits have
different standards about what conduct will trigger the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws. 16 While the Supreme Court has continued to
recognize a presumption against extraterritoriality, the strength of that
presumption and how litigants can overcome it has not been clarified by
recent Supreme Court holdings.1 7 The extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act, in particular, has greatly expanded since its inception. 18
While it is now established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially, courts have used various standards to judge its
application to foreign conduct.1 9

14. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
15. See John H. Knox, A PresumptionAgainst Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351,
376 (2010) (describing the evolution of presumption against extraterritoriality and analyzing the
reasons for its varying construction by the courts).
16. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 101 (1998). For example, Chief Judge Abner Mikva of the D.C. Circuit
ignored the presumption in applying the National Environmental Policy Act when there were effects
felt in the United States and conduct occurred in the United States. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit
takes a more restrictive view on extraterritoriality with copyright law and limits the application of
U.S. law to conduct abroad, even when there are effects in the United States. Id. The Fifth Circuit in
the context of securities law cases uses the presumption by focusing on the effects, instead of where
the conduct occurs. Id.
17. See Knox, supra note 15, at 376-77.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976)
(acknowledging the effects test, but introducing a comity balancing analysis); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially when the effects are felt in the United States).
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The Sherman Act

The Sherman Act 20 is the United States' antitrust statute that
prohibits anticompetitive business activity, such as monopolies and
price-fixing. 2' The DOJ can bring criminal penalties, including
imprisonment and fines, against individuals and corporations for
violating the Sherman Act, and private plaintiffs allegedly injured by
Sherman Act violations have a private right of action in federal court.22
Central to a Sherman Act violation is an agreement among parties to act
in an anticompetitive manner Price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market
allocation are per se criminal violations of the Sherman Act.24 The DOJ
finds that "[s]uch agreements have been shown to defraud consumers
and unquestionably raise prices or restrict output without creating any
plausible offsetting benefit to consumers.' 25
B. The Development of an Expansive ExtraterritorialAntitrust Regime
The Sherman Act was originally construed as a strictly territorial
statute.26 The Supreme Court officially proclaimed this in 1909.27 It was

followed until 1945.28 By the close of the twentieth century, though, the
Sherman Act was construed to not only apply extraterritorially, but to
apply so broadly that courts today are not required to consider
international comity in certain cases. 29 Foreign criminal conduct by
foreign entities can now trigger liability for Sherman Act violations
as well.30
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
21. Id.§1.
22. Id. § 15 (giving plaintiffs injured by Sherman Act violations a private right of action in
federal district court).
23.

ANTITRUST DW., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL LAW

ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 2 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
209114.pdf.
24. Id.at 4. The DOJ defines price-fixing as "an agreement among competitors at any level of
the economy (manufacturers, distributors, or retailers) to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at
which their products or services are sold." Id. at 5. Bid-rigging is defined as "the way that
conspiring businesses effectively raise prices where purchasers-often federal, state, or local
governments-acquire products or services by soliciting bids." Id.at 8. Market allocation occurs
when competitors agree "to divide the market among themselves." Id at 11.
25. Id. at 4.
26. See Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has
Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 221, 224-25
(1994).
27. Id. at 225.
28. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
29. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993).
30. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
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1. Territoriality in American Banana
The plaintiff in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,3 a U.S.
corporation, tried to recover damages under the Sherman Act from
another U.S. company for activity that took place in Latin America. 32
The Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust laws did not apply to conduct
outside of the United States.33 American Banana established that the
Sherman Act did not apply extraterritorially because "the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be 34determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done.,
The Court distinguished exercising jurisdiction over acts in a region
governed by a sovereign from situations "in regions subject to no
sovereign., 35 In sovereign-less regions, a country's court could exercise
jurisdiction extraterritorially to adjudicate disputes between its own
citizens.36 However, in a region with a sovereign, such as the Latin
American nations where the disputed activity in American Banana
occurred, it "would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state
concerned justly might resent," to apply one nation's laws in the territory
of another.37
In American Banana, the Supreme Court strictly adhered to the
territorial principal of jurisdiction.3 8 This helped to prevent international
tensions and was a predictable and efficient way of exercising
jurisdiction. 39 However, territoriality was soon expanded to embrace
extraterritorial effects as a basis for jurisdiction.4 °

31. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
32. Id. at 354-55.
33. See id. at 357.
34. Id. at 356 (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)).
35. See id. at 355-56.
36. Id. at 356.
37. See id.
38. See Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1455, 1466 (2008).
39. Id. at 1466-67.
40. See id. at 1467-68, 1471 (describing the paradigm shift in legal theory that signaled the
end for strictly territorial application of U.S. law).
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2. A Significant Expansion
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"),' 4 the
Second Circuit, designated by the Supreme Court as a court of last resort
for this action,42 decided that the Sherman Act does have extraterritorial
application when violations taking place abroad have intended effects in
the United States.4 3 Alcoa was accused of creating a monopoly for virgin
aluminum ingot and conspiring to restrain trade through an agreement
with Aluminum Limited. 44
However, the anticompetitive activity did not occur in the United
States. 45 Rather than simply applying the general principle from
American Banana-that courts were precluded from applying the
Sherman Act extraterritorially 4 6 -the court created a two-part test to
determine that the court did in fact have jurisdiction.47
In his opinion, Justice Learned Hand found that the anti-competitive
agreements at issue would have been a violation of the Sherman Act had
they occurred within the borders of the United States.4 8 Justice Hand
extrapolated that even though the agreements took place abroad, they
were still unlawful because they had intended substantial effects in the
United States and did in fact affect the United States. 49 Therefore, the
two-part test to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act
is that the defendants intended substantial effects in the United States
and that the alleged anticompetitive action in fact had an effect on the
economy. ° However, Justice Hand also acknowledged that U.S. courts
needed to exercise discretion in applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially. 5 That discretion, he found, should be "the limitations
52
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers."
Justice Hand did not believe that Congress envisioned the Sherman Act's
reach to extend as far as a court's personal jurisdiction.5 3 For example,

41. 148 F.2d416 (2d Cir. 1945).
42. Id. at 421 ("On June 12, 1944, the Supreme Court, declaring that a quorum of six justices
qualified to hear the case was wanting, referred the appeal to this court under § 29 of Title 15 ... .
43. Seeid.at444.
44. Id. at421.
45. See id.at 443.
46. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
47. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 444 (describing how the defendants' conduct was
unlawful if there were intended effects in the United States and the conduct did in fact affect the
United States).
48, Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51, Id. at 443.
52, Id.
53. Id.
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conduct that was not intended to affect U.S. trade, but does so anyway,
should not be included under the Sherman
Act because of the
54
arise."
to
likely
complications
"international
The Alcoa effects test became the standard for extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. 55 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California,56 both the majority 57 and the dissent recognized that Alcoa
firmly established the extraterritorial nature of the Sherman Act. 58 It is so
firmly established, that it has found its way into statute: the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (the "FTAIA")59 is essentially a
codification of the Alcoa effects test. 60 However, the Alcoa effects test
has led to substantial global criticism, especially from nations such as the
61
United Kingdom.
3. Attempts to Limit the Extraterritorial Application of the

Sherman Act
In the decades after Alcoa, some courts began to limit the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act. 62 These courts realized the
negative international implications that arose from the effects test and
sought to limit Alcoa's application.63 In order to curb Alcoa, courts used
the principles of international comity in their analysis of the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.64 Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America 5 was one of the most influential of these cases.66
The Timberlane court and other courts that followed its reasoning
wanted not only a showing of substantial effects, but also a balancing of
54. Id.
55. Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction over
InternationalCartels,72 U. CHi. L. REv. 265, 268 (2005).
56. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
57. Id. at 796 ("[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct
that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.").
58. Id. at 814 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("[I]t is now well established that the Sherman Act
applies extraterritorially.").
59. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
60. See Max Huffinan, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 285, 313-14 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Nicholas Davidson, US. Secondary Sanctions: The U.K.and E.U.Response, 27
STETSON L. REv. 1425, 1426 (1998) (describing how the United Kingdom negatively views the
expansive application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct).
62. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust,43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627,
674-75 (2001).
63. See DABBAH, supranote 9, at 167-68.
64. Id.at 168.
65. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
66. See Swaine, supra note 62, at 674-76 (describing the influence of the decision and how
the American Law Institute included a list of factors similar to those in Timberlane in its revisions
of the Restatement of ForeignRelations Law).
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interests in favor of U.S. jurisdiction before applying the Sherman Act
beyond the territorial confines of the United States.67
In Timberlane, Timberlane Lumber brought an action against Bank
of America for a Sherman Act violation, specifically using the elements
from Alcoa.68 The District Court initially dismissed the action because
there were no direct effects felt in the United States.69 In his decision on
appeal, Judge Herbert Choy addressed the problems of the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, especially from an
international relations perspective.70
In particular, the opinion discussed how foreign nations have
viewed the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law "as excessive
intrusions into their own spheres., 71 However, Judge Choy recognized
that, despite the foreign criticism surrounding its application, the Alcoa
test was typically used by courts to justify exterritorial application of the
Sherman Act.72 The District Court in Timberlane did just that and simply
looked to the effects without discussing other factors, such as comity.73
Judge Choy found the Alcoa test "incomplete because it fail[ed] to
consider other nations' interests. 7 4 In an attempt to modify the test from
Alcoa, Judge Choy articulated a three-part balancing test to determine
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.75 The purpose of the
test was to ensure that a court was exercising jurisdiction in a manner
consistent with prescriptive comity. 7 6 Among the factors for courts to
consider were:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the
foreign commerce of the United States? Is it such a type and magnitude
so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act? As a matter
67. DABBAH, supra note 9, at 168.
68. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 600-01, 605 ("Plaintiffs also allege that there has been a
direct and substantial effect on United States foreign commerce, and that defendants intended the
results of the conspiracy, including the impact on United States commerce."). The plaintiffs properly
alleged both elements, the intended conspiracy with substantial effects, from the Alcoa test. See id.;
see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,444 (2d Cir. 1945).
69. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601. Judge Choy noted that the court below was not specific
about what grounds it was using to dismiss the action. Id. at 601. Two of the possible rationales for
dismissal were failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 602. Judge Choy
chose to review the district court's decision using failure to state a claim. Id. at 603.
70. See id. at 609.
71. Id.
72. Seeid. at610.
73. Id. For the district court, a showing of effects on U.S. commerce was the threshold upon
which to base jurisdiction. Id.
74. Id. at 611-12. Following from that, Judge Choy also recognized that applying U.S. law to
foreign citizens can be controversial and problematic. See id. at 612.
75. Seeid. at615.
76. McNeill, supra note 5, at 436.
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of international comity and fairness, should the 7 7 extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?

The case was ultimately remanded to decide these questions.7 8
Other circuits adopted the Timberlane approach and used comity as
an important factor in their analysis about jurisdiction.79 Some courts,
though, found it difficult to apply Judge Choy's balancing test. 8° His test
was criticized for giving the judicial branch too much political
to inconsistently apply the effects
discretion.81 As such, courts continued
82
test when determining jurisdiction.
4. Towards Expansion
The Supreme Court in Hartford Fire chose not to adopt Judge
Choy's comity-based analysis.83 Instead, the Court focused on a
defendant's ability to comply with American and foreign laws
simultaneously.8 4 After HartfordFire, international comity clearly does
not have a prominent place in a court's analysis whether to apply the
Sherman Act extraterritorially. 85
The plaintiffs in Hartford Fire were nineteen states and private
individuals who brought an action under the Sherman Act against
members of the insurance industry, including foreign companies.8 6 The
defendants allegedly conspired to alter standard form commercial
general liability insurance policies in order to limit their obligations
under the policies.87 Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO") created the

77. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
78. Id.
79. See Sprigman, supra note 55, at 269. This trend, started after Timberlane, came to a halt
subsequent to the Supreme Court's HartfordFire decision. Id.
80. McNeill, supra note 5, at 437-38.
81. S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, The FTAIA and ExtraterritorialEffects: Guidance to
Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust JurisdictionStill Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 805, 813-14
(2006).
82. See McNeill, supra note 5, at 438-39 (describing inconsistent case results after Timberlane
that led to a circuit split).
83. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The PrivateAttorney Generalin a Global Age: Public Interests
in PrivateInternationalAntitrust Litigation,26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 235 (2001).
84. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); Jordan A. Dresnick et
al., The United States as Global Cop: Defining the 'Substantial Effects' Test in U.S. Antitrust
Enforcement in the Americas andAbroad, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 453, 474 (2009).
85. See Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial
Reach of the United States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 204 (1994); Susan E. Burnett,
Comment, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche? Conflicts of
Jurisdiction and InternationalComity in ExtraterritorialAntitrust, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 555,
592 (2004).

86. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 770, 775.
87. Id.at770-71.
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standard policies.88 ISO's members, which included over 1000 insurers,
almost always used these forms. 89 When the defendant insurance
companies were unsuccessful in getting ISO to change the forms, the
plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted in contravention of the Sherman
Act. 90 The alleged activity included persuading British reinsurers to not
provide reinsurance for policies written on the ISO forms. 91
In their complaint, the plaintiffs also claimed that the British
reinsurers conspired to force American primary insurers to only offer
claims-made policies.92 If the American primary insurers did not comply,
the reinsurers would not provide reinsurance contracts. 93 The British
reinsurers also allegedly conspired to not reinsure94 pollution coverage
insurance contracts for the North American market.
The British reinsurers sought to dismiss the action because the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in this case would violate
"the principle of international comity." 95 They were not arguing that
there was no basis for jurisdiction, and in fact conceded that there was
subject matter jurisdiction.96 Instead, they argued that this was a situation
where the interests of the British government were strong enough to
97
counsel against the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
Justice David Souter, writing for the majority, did not accept the British
reinsurers' argument and instead found that the Court had "no need in
this litigation to address ... considerations that might inform a decision
to refrain from the' 98 exercise of jurisdiction on the grounds of
international comity.

88. Id. at 772.
89. Id. The defendant insurers wanted policies that only paid or defended claims made during
the policy period to limit their liability. Id. at 771. They wanted these policies, known as "claimmade" policies, to be retroactive to further limit their liability. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, the insurance companies wanted to no longer cover "sudden and accidental"
pollution, which was typically covered under commercial general liability insurance. Id. Lastly, the
defendant insurance companies wanted to limit the legal fees associated with defending claims. Id.
at 771-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 773-74.
91. Id. at 775.
92. Id. at 776.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 797.
96. Id. at 795.
97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) (No. 91-1128).

98. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 799.
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Justice Souter cited Alcoa as evidence that "it is well
established ... that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States." 99 Because the British reinsurers intended the effects of
their actions to be felt in the United States and their conduct had
substantial effects in the United States, they met both elements of the
Alcoa test. 0 0 The Court of Appeals placed great emphasis on the
reinsurers' intent to affect the United States, and deemphasized
comity. 1°1 Justice Souter, too, seemed especially reticent to apply comity
at all. 10 2 He referenced the FTAIA for the proposition that Congress was
ambivalent about a court's decision to decline to exercise their subject
matter jurisdiction over a Sherman Act claim because of international
comity concerns.' 0 3
Instead of creating a judicial standard for international comity when
extraterritorial applications of the Sherman Act are at issue, Justice
Souter passed on the question.104 He decided that even if a court could
decline to exercise their Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction on the
grounds of comity, "international comity would not counsel against
exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged."' 1 5 Justice Souter
then focused his emphasis on the degree of conflict between British and
American law.' 0 6 The British reinsurers argued that their conduct was
legal under applicable British law and applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially to their conduct would undermine the British regulatory
scheme for reinsurance. 10 7 Justice Souter did not find this relevant.
Because the reinsurers could have complied with laws of both countries,
the fact that their conduct was legal under British10 law
did not preclude
8
Act.
Sherman
the
of
application
the extraterritorial

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
2487).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 796.
See id. at 798.
Id.
See id.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 799.
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C. The CurrentState of the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act has evolved from American Banana,where it was
a strictly territorial statute.' 0 9 It is well-settled law that courts may apply
the Sherman Act extraterritorially to foreign conduct causing effects
within the United States." 0 Recent case law demonstrates the expansive
jurisdiction that courts have to adjudicate Sherman Act violations
resulting from purely foreign conduct."' However, the expansive use of
the effects doctrine has serious consequences, including possible2
criminal penalties for foreign corporations engaged in foreign conduct."
After Hartford Fire, U.S. courts now only need to look to two
factors to determine if they can apply the Sherman Act
extraterritorially.' ' 3 First, they examine the effects on the U.S.
economy. 14 Second, they determine if there is a true conflict between
U.S. antitrust law and foreign law." 5 They do not need to apply a comity
analysis.' 6 A jurisdiction-based comity test has been replaced by a
simple question of whether a party can obey two-albeit different-laws
at the same time. 17
HartfordFire solidified the importance of the Alcoa effects test to
determine the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act and8
deemphasized Judge Choy's comity-based concerns in Timberlane."
Comity in the wake of Hartford Fire is now an incredibly difficult
defense for a foreign defendant to raise when challenging the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.' 9 Foreign entities are
now even 20less certain if their conduct will give rise to a Sherman Act
violation. 1

109. Compare Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (citing Slater v.
Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)), with United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 444 (1945).
110. See, e.g., HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 796.
111. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Lit., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(exercising jurisdiction over price-fixing conduct in China that had effects in the United States).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
113. See Andrew C. Udin, Comment, Slaying Goliath: The ExtraterritorialApplication of US.
Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2001).
114. See id.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1345.
See id. at 1346 (describing how the conflict test replaced a comity analysis).
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993).
See Udin, supranote 113, at 1346.

119. 1 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.21 (3d
ed. 2011).

120. DABBAH, supranote 9, at 194-95.
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III.

EXPANSIVE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE SHERMAN ACT IS PROBLEMATIC

Justice Scalia dissented in Hartford Fire about the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act to the British defendants' foreign
conduct. 12 ' His opinion addressed what he saw as serious problems with
expansive extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. 122 Much of his
dissent focused on the majority's lack of respect for international law. 121
Foreign nations, too, joined Justice Scalia in their disapproval of
expansive international antitrust enforcement. 124 However, despite
Justice Scalia's concerns, subsequent courts have felt bound by Hartford
Fire, even in the criminal context. 121 In F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 26 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide a
new standard that addressed Justice Scalia's concerns about international
comity, but instead limited its holding to antitrust suits causing wholly
foreign injury. 127 The current state of the extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act continues to reflect Justice Scalia's concerns because it
continues to complicate
international relations and ignores customary
128
international law.
A. Justice Scalia'sDissent in Hartford Fire
Justice Scalia framed his dissent by addressing two questions raised
in the British reinsurers' argument against extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act. 129 The first question was whether the District Court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the Sherman Act claim. 30 It was
obvious to Justice Scalia that there was in fact subject matter jurisdiction

121. HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See infra Part III.A.
123. See infra Part III.A.
124. Brief for the Gov't of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1-2, United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001); Brief for the Gov't of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
3, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No. 91-1128).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998) ("Under settled principles of statutory construction, we also are bound
to apply [the rule from Hartford Fire] by interpreting Section One [of the Sherman Act] the same
way in a criminal case.").
126. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
127. See Burnett, supra note 85, at 607 (describing how the Supreme Court discussed comity in
Empagran,but "oversimplifie[d] the issues" by limiting its holding to foreign injury).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 269-78; see also McNeill, supra note 5, at 452-53
(discussing the global community's resentment toward the U.S. antitrust regime).
129. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
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because a Sherman Act violation arises under a federal statute.' 3 ' In fact,
Justices Souter and Scalia agreed about subject matter jurisdiction.'3 2
Therefore, the more substantive question was whether the Sherman Act
could be applied extraterritorially to the British reinsurers' conduct.' 33
This was not a question of subject matter jurisdiction. 134 Instead, the
issue was whether Congress, when it enacted the Sherman Act, intended
the statute 5 to reach the wholly foreign conduct of the British
reinsurers.13
To determine if the District Court could apply the Sherman Act to
the foreign conduct, Justice Scalia began with an analysis of prescriptive
jurisdiction.1 36 Prescriptive jurisdiction is the ability of a nation to "make
its laws applicable to persons or activities."137 Under the Constitution,
Congress certainly has the explicit power to make laws relating to
commerce. 138 Those laws are not strictly territorial and can extend
outside of the United States.139 However, the issue for Justice Scalia0 was
how Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply extraterritorially.14
In determining the extent of prescriptive jurisdiction, Justice Scalia
relied on two canons of construction: that statutes are presumed to not
apply extraterritorially and that statutes should never violate customary
international law.' 41 The first canon, the presumption against
extraterritoriality, was overcome because case precedent firmly
established that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially. 14 Justice
Scalia found that the second canon, that statutes are presumed not 14to3
violate customary international law, was not met in Hartford Fire.
This canon is implicated only after the presumption against
extraterritoriality is met or is not applicable. 144 Because the first canon
was satisfied, Justice Scalia looked at the extent to which the application
of the Sherman45 Act in this case would offend customary
international law.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id,
See id.; accord id.
at 795 (majority opinion).
Id.at 813 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Id.

135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 813-14.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 813.
Id.at 813-14.
ld. at 814.
Id.at 814-15 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)).
Id. at 814.
Id.at 819.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 815.
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Justice Scalia would have dismissed the case for failure to state146a
claim because the second canon of construction was not met.
Applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially in Hartford Fire offended
147
customary international law because it ignored prescriptive comity.
Prescriptive comity is "the respect sovereign nations afford each other by
limiting the reach of their laws.' 48 This is a distinct concept from the
comity of courts, which is when "judges decline to exercise jurisdiction
over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere., 149 Comity played
an important role in the dissent because "using international law to limit
the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in [U.S.]
jurisprudence."15
If the District Court allowed the plaintiffs' claim to proceed, the
United States was ignoring the United Kingdom's ability to regulate its
reinsurance industry.' 5' The presence of that comprehensive regulatory
scheme made it evident to Justice Scalia that it was unreasonable for the
United States to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially to the British
conduct. 152 Therefore, Justice Scalia thought it
reinsurers'
"unimaginable" that Congress intended its prescriptive jurisdiction to
53
govern this conduct, given how unreasonable it would be.'
The majority opinion, then, sharply differed from Justice Scalia's
approach to comity. 154 For Justice Scalia, the comity analysis is not
about exercising jurisdiction, but instead about whether the Sherman
Act, as contemplated by Congress, actually covered the British
reinsurers' conduct.15 5 Even though the parties themselves blurred the
lines of the role of comity in adjudicative jurisdiction and prescriptive
the way the majority ignored the
jurisdiction, Justice Scalia rejected
56
prescriptive jurisdiction question.'
146. See id. at 822. Justice Scalia would not have dismissed the claim based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because he found that there was subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 813.
Instead, he found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the extraterritorial reach of the
statute did not extend to the conduct of which they complain. See id.
147. See id. at 817-19.
148. Id. at 817.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 818.
151. Seeid.at819.
152. Id.Justice Scalia used the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law to show the
unreasonableness of applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially over the British reinsurers. Id
(citing the 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987)). Under the
Restatement (Third), prescriptive jurisdiction is unreasonable when, inter alia, there is a limited
nexus to the state seeking to enforce its law and when two nations' laws are conflicting. See id.
153. See id. at 819.
154. See id. at 820.
155. See id. at 813-14, 819.
156. See id.at 820 (noting that the majority improperly characterized the issue as whether a
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Had Justice Scalia also chosen-albeit erroneously-to do a comity
analysis through an adjudicative jurisdiction framework, as the majority
did, he still would have come up with the different result than the
majority. 157 Justice Scalia recognized that the adjudicative jurisdiction
analysis done by the majority created a serious problem because it
ignored comity unless compliance with both U.S. and foreign law was
impossible.1 58 This would lead to an even broader application of the
Sherman Act, which would have negative consequences on international
relations, especially regarding nations with which the United States
shares a trade relationship. 159 In following the majority's rationale at
looking at "true conflict," Justice Scalia would have seen that the real
conflict was between the legitimate interests of the United States and the
United Kingdom. 160 Therefore, even if assuming, arguendo, the majority
properly characterized the issue as one of conflict of laws instead of
prescriptive jurisdiction, the Hartford Fire majority still needed to
recognize and respect6 1the United Kingdom's interest in regulating the
reinsurance industry. 1
Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford Fire sought to use comity to2
ensure reasonable application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct.16
He recognized the purpose of the reasonableness factors in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.' 63 His decision was
consistent with the importance of comity used by courts pre-Hartford
Fire.'6 4 The majority, on the contrary, severely limited comity by
relegating it to the infrequent situations 16when
foreign law requires a
5
party to act in contravention of U.S. laws.
Courts have taken the majority decision in HartfordFire so literally
that the role of comity in the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act is now severely limited. 66 Comity, which was once an important

court could adjudicate the dispute, rather than if the Sherman Act actually covered the alleged
conduct). The District Court unquestionably had adjudicative jurisdiction because the Sherman Act
was the claim at issue. Id. at 812.
157. Id. at 820.
158. Seeid.
159. Id.
160.
161.
162.

See id. at 820-21.
Seeid. at819-21.
See id at 817.

163.

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Commentary, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the

Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflection on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.

42,49(1995).
164. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563,
569 (2000).
165.

Id.

166.

See id.
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restraint on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, was
virtually eliminated by the majority in Hartford Fire.'67 Instead of
providing courts useful guidance about when and when not to apply the
Sherman Act extraterritorially, the majority in HartfordFire allowed for
"a triumph for governmental regulation of anticompetitive behavior., 168
Justice Scalia sought to prevent unreasonable application of a powerful
statute abroad, 169 whereas the majority legitimized broad application of
the Sherman Act extraterritorially. 17 As seen in recent cases, 171 courts
are now predisposed
in favor of extraterritorial application of the
172
Sherman Act.
B. Hartford Fire's Impact on CriminalSherman Act Prosecutions
173
The impact of Hartford Fire was not limited to civil actions.
Rather, the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Nippon Paper
Industries174 brought the holding from HartfordFire into the criminal
context. 175 The First Circuit expanded Hartford Fire, despite the
detrimental impact that the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act has had on relations between the United States and Japan.
In Nippon Paper, a grand jury indicted Nippon Paper Industries
Co., Ltd. ("NPI"), a Japanese company, for conspiring to fix the price of
thermal fax paper in North America. 176 NPI moved to dismiss the
indictment because all of the activity occurred in Japan. 77 The DOJ
opposed the motion because the effects of the price-fixing were felt in
the United States and co-conspirators were in the United States. 78 The
First Circuit denied NPI's motion because it felt bound by HartfordFire,
even though
Hartford Fire was a civil action and this was a criminal
9
case.

17

167. Id.
168. Phillip R. Trimble, Commentary, The Supreme Court and InternationalLaw: The Demise
of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1995).
169. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 819 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Trimble, supra note 168, at 57.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
172. John A. Trenor, Comment, Jurisdiction and the ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust
Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1608 (1995).
173. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 9.
174. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
175. Id. at9.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. Because the alleged activity took place in Japan, NPI argued that the indictment failed
to state a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
178.

Id.

179.

Id. at 9 ("Under settled principles of statutory construction, we also are bound to apply
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The First Circuit did discuss comity in its decision. 18 It saw
international comity as "a doctrine that counsels voluntary forbearance
when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes
that a second sovereign also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction.''
This conception of comity fit into Justice Scalia's definition of comity of
courts and not prescriptive comity, which is the type of comity he found
applicable to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. 82 While the
First Circuit did recognize comity's diminished stature after Hartford
Fire, it did not seek to revitalize comity or distinguish this situation from
that of the British reinsurers in HartfordFire.'83 Instead, it used Hartford
Fire's holding to show that the Japanese defendant's comity claim was
"even more attenuated" than that of the British reinsurers because its
184
conduct was illegal "under both Japanese and American laws."'
Therefore, the court found no reason to accept NPI's comity
comity to
argument. 185 Instead, it found that extending considerations of 186
NPI would "create perverse incentives" for foreign defendants.
Nippon Paper was an opportunity for the First Circuit to limit the
decision in HartfordFire to only civil cases. 87 This decision not to do
so shows the magnitude of the Supreme Court's holding in HartfordFire
because that holding has expanded jurisdiction not just for the Sherman
Act civilly but also criminally. 88 The Nippon Paper decision is also
significant because the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
sees the extraterritorial application of criminal law to be "particularly
intrusive.',189 However, the Nippon Paper court did not consider the
Restatement, which is rooted in comity. 90 This was consistent with
HartfordFirebecause "the Supreme Court rejected the notion of comitystyle analysis as binding U.S. law."' 19 1

[the rule from Hartford Fire] by interpreting Section One [of the Sherman Act] the same way in a
criminal case.").
180.

Id.at 8-9.

181.
182.

Id. at 8.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

183.

See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8.

184. Id.
185.

See id.

186. Id.
187. Chad Stockel, Note, Sherman's March on Japan: U.S. v. Nippon Paper and the
ExtraterritorialReach of CriminalAntitrust Law, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399, 420

(1999).
188. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 9.
189. Stockel, supra note 187, at 412 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 403 reporter's note 8 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id.at412-13.
191. See id.
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By expanding the holding of Hartford Fire, the First Circuit set a
precedent that gives the United States overreaching authority to control
foreign conduct. 192 One of the dangers of Nippon Paper is that the
United States can influence another nation's economic policy by
applying criminal antitrust statutes to that nation's corporations and
citizens. 93 Another danger is that foreign defendants would have the
burden of defending their wholly foreign conduct in U.S. criminal
94
courts.1

International relations can easily be harmed by a criminal antitrust
regulatory scheme that closely mirrors Nippon Paperbecause it does not
foster cooperation among states.'95 Further, nations can retaliate against
the application of the Sherman Act extraterritorially by doing the same
196
with their laws in connection with U.S. corporations or individuals.
Given that there are vastly different economic policies functioning in an
97
antitrust statute, this can have a negative impact on the U.S. economy. 1
C. A Missed Opportunity
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,' 98 comity had a
small reprise. 99 The Supreme Court took into consideration the concerns
about extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act raised in amicus
briefs by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. 200 Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote for the majority, used
these briefs in his decision to decline to extend the Sherman Act to
foreign conduct causing independent foreign injury. 20' The Court
recognized that "America's antitrust laws, when applied to foreign
conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation's ability independently to
regulate its own commercial affairs"; however, it did not see that as a
per se violation of prescriptive comity when that conduct has causes.20 2
192. See Elliott Sulcove, Comment, The ExtraterritorialReach of the CriminalProvisions of
U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Impact of United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 1067, 1093 (1998).
193. Id. at 1093-94.
194. Id.
195. Michael Bishop, Note, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.: Criminal
Application of the Sherman Act Abroad,32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271, 290 (1999).
196. Seeid. at290-91.
197. Seeid. at289.
198. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
199. Ralf Michaels, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., DUKE U. SCH. L.,
http://web.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/commentary/thovemp
(last
visited
Nov. 5, 2012).
200. Id.
201. SeeEmpagran, 542 U.S. at 167-68, 175.
202. See id. at 165.
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Instead, it found that prescriptive comity did allow the United States to
laws extraterritorially for injuries felt within the
exercise its antitrust
20 3
United States.
The defendant, Empagran S.A., sought to dismiss the plaintiffs'
class action lawsuit against foreign and domestic vitamin
manufacturers. 0 4 The class consisted of both foreign and domestic
purchasers of vitamins who alleged that manufacturers engaged in price° The plaintiffs alleged that the
fixing, which violated the Sherman Act.205
vitamin manufacturers engaged in foreign anticompetitive activity,
which had adverse effects not only in the United States, but also negative
foreign effects.20 6 The Supreme Court declined to exercise the
Sherman Act extraterritorially for the foreign conduct causing foreign
harm, but it did hold that the domestic purchasers had a cognizable
Sherman Act claim.20 7
The Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran was based in part on the
FTAIA. 20 8 The FTAIA limits the application of the Sherman Act when
anticompetitive conduct causes only foreign injury.20 9 It also mentioned
comity in its decision to limit the Sherman Act's application when a
plaintiff alleges a purely foreign injury.2 10 The Court held that declining
to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially in this situation "properly
reflects considerations of comity. '' 211 However, the Supreme Court did
not use Empagran as an opportunity to reinstate comity considerations
when considering the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act for
any type of foreign conduct.2 12
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority for two reasons. 2 First,
he agreed with the majority's construction of the FTAIA.2 14 Second, he
found the majority's holding to be consistent "with the principle that
statutes should be read in accord with the customary deference to the
application of foreign countries' laws within their own territories. 21 5

203. Id.
204. Id. at 159-60.
205. Id. at 159.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 158 (citing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)).
209. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
210. Id. at 175.
211. Id.
212. See Huffman, supra note 60, at 324 (noting how the Empagran decision "did not
explicitly cast doubt on HartfordFire").
213. See Empagran,542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214. Id.
215. Id.
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This echoed the second principle of statutory construction upon which he
relied in his dissenting opinion in HartfordFire.216
Empagran failed to adequately remedy the international relations
conflicts and customary international law violations caused by Hartford
217
Fire and expanded by Nippon Paper.
While it did introduce a
prescriptive comity analysis for conduct that had foreign injury, courts
are still bound by Hartford Fire when conduct has effects within the
United States. 2 8 The problem, therefore, caused by the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act needs to be addressed through a new
judicial standard. 21 9 That standard must be rooted in prescriptive comity
because that would afford the greatest opportunity to improve
international relations, especially among some of the United States'
closest trading partners who are frequent targets of antitrust actions.220
D. The Global Community Disapprovesof the
Expansive Reach of the Sherman Act
The expansive reach of the Sherman Act has been met with
resistance from other nations,22 1 especially from countries with which
the United States is a trading partner.22 2 Some nations oppose the United
States' antitrust regime because it infringes on their sovereignty and thus
violates international law.223 Other nations are concerned about the
detrimental effects on their economies caused by the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law. 4 The United Kingdom is one of the
most vociferous objectors to the globalized reach of U.S. antitrust
laws. 225 Japan, too, strongly disapproves of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws into its sovereign territory. 226 Both
216. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia used the canon of construction in his dissenting opinion that statutes
should not be read to conflict with customary international law, including prescriptive comity. Id. at
814-15, 817. Scalia also recognized in Empagran that the majority acknowledged prescriptive
comity. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
217. See Huffman, supra note 60, at 323-24 (describing that despite the contrast between
Empagran and Hartfordin terms of comity, the Empagran Court did not undo Hartford's rule).
218. See Michaels, supra note 199 (noting that the result of Empagran could have been
different had the conduct caused domestic injury).
219. See infra Part I.B.
220. See infra Part 1.B.
221. Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L.
REv. 343, 384 (1997) [hereinafter Waller, Internationalization].
222. Patricia Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable
Expectations," 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (1999).
223. See McNeill, supra note 5, at 452-53.
224. Waller, supra note 221, at 384.
225. Id.
226. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1099

Japanese and British nationals and businesses have frequently been
targets of U.S. antitrust prosecution, despite their nations' much weaker
antitrust enforcement schemes. 22 ' Even U.S. courts that have allowed
U.S. antitrust law to apply extraterritorially recognized the validity of
this concern.228
While the United States and the United Kingdom have formed a
strong and mutually beneficial military alliance,229 the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws has been a source of tension between
the two nations. 230 The United States and United Kingdom have
fundamentally different perspectives about the extraterritorial application
of their own laws, especially with antitrust laws. 231 The United Kingdom
adopts a more restrictive view, compared to the liberal effects test used
in the United States. 2 With few exceptions, the United Kingdom will
only exercise jurisdiction over actions occurring in its territories or the
actions in foreign territories perpetrated by its own nationals or domestic
corporations.2 33 Antitrust matters do not seem to fall under the
exceptions, as the view of the British government is that "substantive
jurisdiction in antitrust matters should only be taken on the basis of the
territorial principle or the nationality principle. 234
The United Kingdom has criticized the much more expansive
effects test employed by the United States because it infringes on other
nations' sovereign rights. 231 In 1978, the British government expressed
its disapproval in a diplomatic note.236 The note, prepared on behalf of
the British Embassy by Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary
237
for International Finance and Development Charles F. Meissner

227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("It is often argued before United States courts that the application of United States
antitrust laws to foreign nations violates principles of comity. Those pleas are legitimately
considered.").
229. Cheryl Pellerin, US., U.K. Military Relationship Essential, Mullen Says, U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE (June 10, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id--64282.
230. Davidson, supra note 61, at 1425. At the time Mr. Davidson wrote this article, he was the
First Secretary (Trade Policy) at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. Id.at 1425 n.*.
231. Seeid.at1426.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234.

See D.M. Jacobs, ExtraterritorialApplication of Competition Laws: An English View, 13

INT'L LAW. 645, 647 (1979). The British position would allow for an exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign person or company as long as the anticompetitive activity occurred in the United Kingdom.
Id.The nationality principle permits states to exert jurisdiction over its own nationals abroad, as
long as it does not infringe on another nation's sovereignty. Id
235. Davidson, supranote 61, at 1426-27.
236. Jacobs, supra note 234, at 648.
237. Id.at 648 n.7.
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stated: "HM Government considers that in the present state of
international law there is no basis for the extension of one country's
antitrust jurisdiction to activities outside of that country .... ,238
Even more, the United Kingdom passed the Protection of Trading
Interests Act (the "PTLA") 23 9 in 1980 as a result of the nation's strong
disapproval of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law and in
order to protect its domestic industries. 240 The PTIA "provide[s]
protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed or
given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and
affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the United
Kingdom., 241 Not only does the PTIA provide protections against the
extraterritorial application of foreign laws in the United Kingdom, but it
also deters parties from bringing private actions.242 Through protective
discovery measures and the unenforceability of certain judgments, 243 it
becomes more expensive and less certain to bring a private antitrust
lawsuit against a British company. 2 "
The United Kingdom referenced the PTIA in its amicus brief
supporting the British reinsurers in HartfordFire.245 Its major argument
in the brief was that international law prohibits the type of extraterritorial
application sought by the plaintiffs in HartfordFire.246 While the United
Kingdom acknowledged that it worked with the United States on
adjudicating disputes surrounding conduct that was illegal in both
countries, it recognized the friction that extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act has caused between the two nations. 247 The British
government did not take the position that all instances of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antirust law were prohibited by
international law.248 Instead, its disapproval in this particular case was
based on how exercising jurisdiction over the British reinsurers would

238. Id. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. 1980, c. 11 (Eng.).
240. See Davidson, supra note 61, at 1427. A British minerals company was facing treble
damages as the result of a U.S. antitrust lawsuit, which prompted the passage of the PTIA. Id.
241. Protection of Trading Interests Act, c. 11.
242. See Davidson, supranote 61, at 1428.
243. See Protection of Trading Interests Act §§ 2, 4-6.
244. Davidson, supranote 61, at 1428.
245. Brief for the Gov't of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) (No. 91-1128). The United Kingdom used the PTIA as evidence of its substantial interest in
the HartfordFirelitigation. See id. at 4.
246. See id. at 14.
247. Id. at 2-3.
248. Id. at 3.
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interfere with Britain's ability to regulate its own industries. 249 The
United Kingdom argued that international law required the U.S. courts to
decline to adjudicate the matter because it would be unreasonable to
exercise jurisdiction over the British defendants. 250 Further, the British
government mirrored Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford Fire by
recognizing the canon of construction that U.S. laws should not be
construed to violate international law.25 Following from this canon, the
amicus brief argued that the Sherman Act has not been previously
construed by the Supreme Court so as to ignore its impact on
U.S. allies.252
The government of Canada also submitted an amicus brief
supporting the foreign petitioners in Hartford Fire because of its
concerns about U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 53 Canada did not want
the conduct of the British reinsurers to be included under the Sherman
Act because it would violate international law.25 4 The conduct of the
British reinsurers was legal in the United Kingdom, and Canada did not
want U.S. antitrust laws to apply to conduct that was legal in the country
where it occurred. 5 In its brief, Canada also raised an important
question: Would the United States want another nation to apply its laws
extraterritorially to conduct that was legal in the United States, but
illegal in that foreign country? 25 6 Like the United Kingdom, though,
Canada recognized its relationship with the United States and because of
that close economic relationship, Canada did not want applications of
U.S. law to conflict with international law.257
Canada recognized the same canon of construction that the British
government and Justice Scalia used: that U.S. laws should not be
construed to violate international law. 8 International law would not
permit a nation to apply its economic regulatory laws to foreign conduct
when that application is inconsistent with the foreign nation's economic
policy. 2 5 9 Canadian courts do not apply Canadian law in situations where
249. Id. at 5.
250. See id. at 22-23.
251. See id. at 16-17.
252. Id. at 19.
253. Brief for the Gov't of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Certain Petitioners at 1,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No. 91-1128).
254. See id. at 5-6 (noting that the United States follows customary international law and
customary international law prohibits one state from using its economic law to regulate conduct in
another state).
255. See id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 17-18.
257. Id.at 2.
258. Id.at 9.
259. See id. at 6-7.
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the application "would displace or undermine the laws or established
policies of another state. 26 ° Other nations, including Australia,
Switzerland, Germany, and France follow the same judicial restraint as
Canada "as a matter of obligation. 2 61
Similar to the United Kingdom and Canada, Japan and the United
States have a close relationship.2 62 However, Japan is a frequent target of
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.263 In September 2011,
a Japanese company faced $200 million in fines and three Japanese
nationals entered into plea bargains to each serve more than a year of jail
time as a result of price-fixing and bid-rigging in the automotive
industry. 264 Twenty-five Japanese companies have been held liable for
Sherman Act violations that each resulted in a fine of more than $10
million.265 As of December 2011, the DOJ had only collected eightynine fines that were more than $10 million.266 On that same list compiled
by the DOJ, only fifteen U.S. companies faced fines of more than $10
million.267 Japan, 268
not the United States, was the most represented nation
on the DOJ's list.
Japan, in Nippon Paper, filed an amicus brief in favor of defendant
NPI, which strongly opposed the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act. 269 The amicus brief acknowledged the close relationships
between the two nations. 270 However, it reasoned that the relationship
was based on "mutual respect for each Nation's sovereignty., 27 1 Japan
saw extraterritorial applications of law as "infring[ing] the sovereign
rights of other countries. 2 72 Because Nippon Paper was a criminal
matter, the government of Japan found the extraterritorial application to
be "particularly problematic. 273 One of the problems Japan articulated

260. Id. at 7.
261. Idat7-8.
262.

Partnershipfor Security and Prosperity, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND His CABINET

(June 30, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0630anzen-e.html.
263. See, e.g., SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS, supranote 2, at 1-7.
264. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Furukawa Elec. Co. Ltd. and Three Executives Agree to
Plead Guilty to Auto. Parts Price-Fixing and Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Sept. 29, 2011), availableat
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2011/275503.pdf.
265. SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS, supra note 2, at 1-7.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Brief for the Gov't of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1-2, United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001).
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 7-8.
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that their
was the inability of foreign defendants to "foresee or predict
274
abroad.,
punishment
criminal
to
them
expose
could
conduct
The government of Japan illustrated that if a Japanese court tried to
use Japanese law to regulate domestic conduct in the United States, the
United States would find it unreasonable.2 75 There would be a conflict
between U.S. law and policy and Japanese law and policy. 276 Therefore,
Japan viewed the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in
Nippon Paper to be "an offensive interference with Japanese
jurisdiction., 277 Japan instead advocated for coordination on antitrust
laws between nations without any unilateral assertions of jurisdiction.2 78
While foreign governments have submitted amici curiae briefs to
express their concerns, their lack of effectiveness has led nations to
question the impartiality of the U.S. judiciary when deciding
extraterritorial applications of law. 279 The Seventh Circuit boldly
rejected the amicus briefs of foreign governments in a case involving
uranium cartels. 280 In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,281 Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom submitted amicus briefs
opposing jurisdiction.282 However, the Seventh Circuit flatly rejected the
briefs because "shockingly to [them], the governments of the defaulters
ha[d] subserviently presented for them their case against the exercise of
jurisdiction., 28 3 Roberts B. Owen, legal adviser of the Department of
State at the time, expressed the concerns of the U.S. government about
this line in the opinion to Associate Attorney General John H.
Shenefield.284
Owen wanted Shenefield to explain to the Seventh Circuit the
problems it caused in the Uranium Antitrust opinion.2 85 These problems
included "serious embarrassment to the United States in its relations with
some of [its] closest allies. 28 6 The Department of State had been

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27-28.

279.

Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign GovernmentalReactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial

Jurisdiction,6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 520-21 (1998).
280. Id. at521.
281. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
282. Id.at 1253.
283. Id. at 1255-56.
284. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 665 (1980).
285. See id.
286. Nash, supra note 284, at 665-67 (quoting Letter from Legal Adviser Roberts Owen to
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engaged in diplomatic contact with other nations about this matter and
had encouraged the nations to submit their amicus briefs.287 It wanted
nations to submit these briefs because it acknowledged other nations'
concerns about the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.2 88 The
Department of State wanted these concerns brought to the attention of
the Seventh Circuit in the interest of foreign relations.289
In 1982, Congress passed the FTAIA. 290 The FTAIA limits the
scope of the Sherman Act by making it only applicable to trade or
commerce with foreign nations if there are substantial and foreseeable
effects on U.S. commerce and if the effects create a cognizable Sherman
Act violation. 291 The first stated purpose of the Act was to ameliorate the
concern that antitrust laws were harming American exporters.2 92 The
second purpose, which is relevant to this Note, was to address the
differing approaches in the courts about the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust statutes.293 Congress felt a "single, objective test" would be
a "simple and straightforward clarification of existing American law. 294
of the
Congress recognized the problems that different interpretations
296
295
effects test caused. However, it did not question the test itself.

Another purpose of the Act was to reduce the tensions between the
United States and its trading partners caused by the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act.297 Congressman Peter Rodino of New
Jersey was aware of these tensions, as were experts who testified in front
of Congress, such as Professor Eleanor Fox of New York University.29 8
The FTAIA, however, has been criticized as a "poorly drafted,
needlessly complicated and woefully inadequate statute" because it does

Asst. Att'y Gen. John H. Shenefield (Mar. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Roberts Owen Letter]).
287. Id. at 665-66.
288. Id.
289. Id.at 665-67.
290. Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign
Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontierin Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV.
2151, 2156 (2003).
291. ldat2157.
292. H.R. REp. No.97-686 at 2 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487.
293. Id.
294. Id.at 2-3, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487-88. By clarifying the state of American law for the
for
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, Congress envisioned "a clear benchmark ..
business [people], attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners." Id.
295. See id.
at 5-6, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2490-91.
at 5, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2490. Congress accepted that the place of the effect, not
296. See id.
the place of the action, as determinative in the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. See
id
297. Huffman, supranote 60, at 305.
298. See also id. at 308-09.
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not provide courts with a practical standard.299 It has been criticized
because of its ineffectiveness in limiting the extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act in a meaningful way, so as to solve the serious
international relations issues that arise from the liberal use of the effects
test. 300 Further, the FTAIA did not address the comity-based concerns
that Judge Choy had in Timberlane. °1
When a court decides whether to apply the Sherman Act
extraterritorially, there is concern that judges are not qualified to
evaluate "the diplomatic, national security, and international economic
issues" that inevitably will arise.30 2 Because of the impact
extraterritoriality has on foreign relations, courts should realize that their
function is different than that of the Department of State 30 3 and should
not prescribe to the strongly extraterritorial trend started by Hartford
Fire.3 °4 The British PTAIA 30 5 and the strongly-worded amicus brief filed
by the Japanese government in Nippon Paper30 6 should be lessons to
courts about the negative impact that broad extraterritoriality can have
on foreign relations.30 7 However, the trend is that the DOJ is taking
advantage of the broad extraterritorial rules and aggressively prosecuting
foreign defendants, using creative tactics such as plea bargains with
favorable immigration terms.30 8 Because of the failure of the FTAIA to
adequately address the international community's concerns, 3°9 a new
judicial standard needs to be formulated that recognizes the competing
interests of effective antitrust enforcement and compliance with
international law.3 10

299. Cavanagh, supra note 290, at 2188.
300. See Huffman, supra note 60, at 311. Huffman believes that Congress misunderstood the
confusion about the effects test. See id.
301. See DABBAH, supranote 9, at 169.
302. Griffin, supra note 279, at 519-20.
303. See id
304. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); see, e.g., United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
305. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Eng.).
306. See generally Brief for the Gov't of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001).
307. See, e.g., Nash, supranote 284, at 665-67 (quoting Roberts Owen Letter).
308. Kara Scannell, U.S. Accused of UnfairAntitrust Tactic, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011, 11:04
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ld923292-eOb9-lleO-947a-00144feabdcO.html. U.S. officials
are obtaining plea bargains from foreign defendants whereby they plead guilty, but in exchange
receive an exemption from travel restrictions. Id. Foreign executives found guilty of an antitrust
violation without the exemption would face travel restrictions to the United States. Id. Executives
are willing to take the plea so they can continue their business relationships in the United States
after serving jail time. Id.
309. See Huffman, supra note 60, at 311, 314-15.
310. See infra Part IV.B.
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IV. How TO USE COMITY TO LIMIT THE
SHERMAN ACT'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH

Simply telling courts to reinstate a comity analysis will not solve
the problems caused by the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act. 3t While the concept of comity is often cited by courts, it lacks a
clear definition.3 12 Even less clear is how courts ought to apply
comity. 313 Adding to the confusion of comity is that there are two
distinct types of comity: comity of courts and prescriptive comity. 314
A. Comity: An Ambiguous Term
For the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, Justice
Scalia found that prescriptive comity-"the respect sovereign nations
afford each other by limiting the reach of their law"-ought to guide a
court's application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct.315 Justice
Scalia's definition of prescriptive comity was rooted in the "comity of
nations," as opposed to the "comity of courts. 316 The Supreme Court in
Hilton v. Guyot3 17 defined comity as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
'3 8 Hilton is often cited by courts for its definition of
convenience.
9
comity.

31

For the Supreme Court in Hilton, applying laws extraterritorially
depended upon the comity of nations.3 20 However, just as modem courts
have come to inconsistent conclusions about the extraterritorial

311. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 508 U.S. 764, 818 n.9 (1993) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (explaining the confusion courts have had in distinguishing the comity of courts and
prescriptive comity); see also Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1322 (1985) (describing the difficulty in
applying the principle of comity).
312. Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity,'"83 IOWA L. REv. 893,893 (1998).
313. See id. at 902-05 (explaining the difficulties courts have using comity).
314. HartfordFire, 508 U.S. at 817.
315. Id. For purposes of this Section, all references to "prescriptive comity" will follow that
definition.
316. Id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38 (1834)).
Justice Story defined "comity of nations" as "the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the
laws of one nation within the territories of another." STORY, supra.
317. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
318. Id. at 163-64.
319. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1,8-9 (1991).
320. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted). While not using the same
terms as modem courts, the Supreme Court in Hilton recognized that one nation's laws "operat[ing]
within the dominion of another nation, depends upon... 'the comity of nations."' Id.
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application of the Sherman Act 32 1 because of various understanding of
what comity requires, the Supreme Court in Hilton recognized that
comity is a difficult term.3 22 It could not, though, find an appropriate
substitute to the amorphous concept of comity. 323 The Court also could
not define the role of comity, placing it somewhere between "mere
324
courtesy and good will" and "a matter of absolute obligation.
However, modern courts have recognized its important role in the
"international system like the mortar which cements together a brick
house. 325
The purpose of this Note is not to resolve the conflict about what
exactly comity is. Instead, its purpose is to provide a new standard for
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act rooted in how Justice
Scalia used comity in his dissent in HartfordFire.326 Using his definition
can ameliorate one of the paramount problems in the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act: that nations see it as an infringement on
their sovereign rights.327 Because Justice Scalia's definition of
prescriptive comity would function to limit the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act, it is "firmly established in [American]
jurisprudence. 328 Thus, it avoids the myriad problems courts329have had
in deciding the extent to which they need to recognize comity.
B.

Using Justice Scalia'sDefinition ofPrescriptiveComity to Limit the
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Sherman Act

In order to solve the problem created by HartfordFire's majority,
courts must first recognize the importance of prescriptive comity in
deciding whether the Sherman Act reaches foreign conduct. When
foreign conduct causes effects in the United States, the court must then
perform an analysis based on prescriptive comity. 330 As seen in
Empagran, foreign conduct with foreign effects will not allow for an
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. 33 1 Therefore, the
321. See supra Part II.C.
322. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163.
323. See id.
324. Id.at 163-64.
325. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
326. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. See Brief for the Gov't of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 7, United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001).
328. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 818.
329. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164-65.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
331. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
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Supreme Court has used prescriptive comity in the past when it declined
33 2
to allow U.S. law to intrude on the sovereignty of another nation.
There is no need for any type of analysis in these situations because case
law firmly establishes that these types of cases involve no justiciable
claim.333 There are two situations where courts would have to perform a
comity analysis. The first situation is when conduct is legal-but not
required-in the country where it occurred, but proscribed under the
Sherman Act.334 The second situation is when conduct is illegal under
both the Sherman Act and the laws of the country where it occurred.335
1. The HartfordFire-Type Situation
To properly use prescriptive comity, courts must look beyond
whether conduct is simply legal in another country. They must look to
how the industry in which the alleged anticompetitive conduct is
regulated by the foreign country where it occurred. If the conduct is
regulated under a comprehensive regulatory scheme, such as the
reinsurance industry in HartfordFire, a court should decline to exercise
the Sherman Act extraterritorially in order to respect that nation's right
to regulate its own industries. 336
In Hartford Fire, the foreign defendants who challenged
jurisdiction based on principles of comity were reinsurers based in
London.33 7 The London reinsurance market alone has a thirty percent
market share.3 38As a result, the United Kingdom has developed a
comprehensive regulatory structure for the reinsurance market.339
Therefore, the United Kingdom wanted the United States to respect its
own ability to regulate an industry of national importance.34 ° It did not

332. See id. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. See, e.g., id. at 159 (majority opinion).
334. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
335. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
336. See HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 775 (majority opinion).
338. Thomas Holzheu & Roman Lecher, The Global Reinsurance Market, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE: BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 889

fig. 18.6 (J. David Cummins & Betrard Venard eds., 2007).
339. See Brief for the Gov't of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-11, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) (No. 91-1128). For example, the British legislation requires registered insurers to make
certain filings and to meet minimum capitalization thresholds. Id. at 11.
340. See id. at 13-14 (arguing that "the assertion ofjurisdiction by the U.S. courts here... [is]
an offensive interference with [the United Kingdom's] sovereign rights and significant interests").
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want U.S. antitrust laws to dictate changes to its historic policy,
especially when the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in
Hartford Fire would have done so without any input from the
United Kingdom. 34 1
Using prescriptive comity to decline jurisdiction over foreign
conduct in this way is consistent with the principles of the Member
States of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") in that member states "respect[] ...the interests of other

Member Countries. 3 42 If a court finds that a country has a
comprehensive regulatory scheme in place for a certain industry, the
court must decline to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially to that
conduct. This approach is grounded in prescriptive comity because the
United States would be limiting the reach of its laws so as to respect the
sovereignty of another nation.343 That respect comes from
acknowledging that the United States cannot regulate the economic
activity in every country solely based on effects felt within the
United States. 3 "
The analysis into a country's regulation of an industry would be
objective because it would be "based on externally verifiable
phenomena, as opposed to individual's perceptions.,

345

History of

regulation and a country's market share in an industry are objective
factors.346 Market share is data-based, which is clearly an objective
factor.347 A history of regulation is also an objective factor because it is
based on fact, instead of a judge's opinion about national interests.34 8
U.S. courts can make active inquiries into foreign law. 349 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 grants courts broad authority to decide
issues of foreign law.35 ° Once a party has raised an issue about foreign
law, "the court may consider any relevant material or source, including
341. See id.
342. Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). The list of OECD member nations includes
Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. List of OECD Member Countries-Ratificationof the Convention
on the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/general/

listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecdhtm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
All of these states have had one or more of their domestic corporations face fines under the Sherman
Act of over $10,000,000. Id.; see SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS, supra note 2, at 102.
343. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344. See KY P. EWING, JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE 238 (2d ed. 2006).
345. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "objective").

346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See FED R. CIv. P. 44.1; see also FED R. CRIM. P. 26.1.
350. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
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testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. '351 The court's decision on foreign law is
treated as a matter of law, instead of as a matter of fact.352 The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
a nearly identical rule for using
353
proceedings.
criminal
in
law
foreign
An objective analysis avoids the problems inherent in balancing
tests. 354 Balancing tests are ill-suited to determine the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. 355 These types of tests do not operate
well in practice and become problematic for judges.3 56 Courts cannot
properly judge and balance the political factors inherent in balancing
tests. 357 Further, these balancing tests-which do not represent rules of
international law-have not adequately addressed the comity concerns
raised by foreign nations. 358 Given the open-ended nature of balancing
tests, there can either be multiple answers or no answer.3 59 Judges who
cannot properly balance national interests will inevitably assert
360
jurisdiction, which does nothing to further international relations.
However, an objective analysis grounded in prescriptive comity would
solve many of the international relations issues because a nation's
sovereignty is adequately protected.
One proposed solution to the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act is modifying the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law.36 1 In its current form, the Restatement provides a list of factors for
courts to balance when deciding if they ought to apply laws

351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1.
354. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
355. Id. (describing the impracticality of a balancing test when deciding prescriptive
jurisdiction).
356. See WALLER, supra note 119, at § 6.13.
357. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949-50.
358. See id. at 950.
359. Cf Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
ExtraterritorialApplication of US. Law, 95 MINN. L. REv. 110, 158-59 (2010) (describing how the
Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations' balancing test is problematic because there is no guidance
about how to weigh the factors).
360. See Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is
"Reasonableness" the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 577 (1987).
361. See Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Effects Jurisdiction: From Hands-Off to HandsLinked, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 159, 168 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Modernization].
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extraterritorially. 362 This new Restatement would use the locus of
principle effects and principle contacts as an important factor.363 Courts
would also look at the "combined overall welfare of the communities
affected. 364 Instead of including the list of factors to be weighed from
the current form in the new Restatement, the revised Restatement would
include factors in a comment that could possibly be used when deciding
whether to apply a law extraterritorially. 365 This approach recognizes
that the current Restatement factors are not applicable in all
circumstances and are outdated.3 66 Even though this new approach
would include a comity-type analysis by acknowledging the effects of
enforcement in a foreign country, it still leads to a balancing test of
interests.367 Further, this new approach continues to reinforce the effects
as the most important factor for application of a law extraterritorially and
not the place of the conduct. 368 This would not be consistent with
prescriptive comity because it ignores the sovereignty of the nation
where the conduct occurred.
Foreign nations who sharply oppose the extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act should continue to submit amicus briefs explaining
their industries to U.S. courts. Amicus briefs can give the court valuable
insight into an industry. 369 The use of amicus briefs in appellate litigation
is well-established under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 7 °
The Supreme Court also has established rules for amicus briefs.3 71 At the
trial level, the foreign governments would be litigating amici.3 72 Even
though these amici are not common in typical litigation, foreign

362. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
363. See Fox, Modernization, supranote 361, at 168.
364. Id.at 169.
365. Id.at 170.
366. See id. (noting that certain factors have less weight depending on the circumstances).
367. See id. at 168-70.
368. Id.at 168.
369. See Daniel Schimmel,
The Influence of Amicus Briefs and Morrison,
CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (July 5, 2010), http://www.conflictoflaws.net/2010/the-influence-of-amicusbriefs-and-morrison/.
370. See FED. R. APP. P. 29. Parties that are not the United States, its officer, its agency, or a
state, do need leave of court to file an amicus brief. Id. However, a party with a strong interest, such
as a foreign country whose citizen or domestic corporation is a party, will be able to show a strong
interest and reasons why their brief will help the determination of the case. Id
371.

SUP.CT.R.37.

372. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, andAdversarialism,27 REv. LITIG. 669, 679-80 & n.51 (2008).
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governments participating as litigating amici can help guide courts about
the regulatory structure of a particular industry.373
2. Nippon Paper-Type Situations
A prescriptive comity analysis when conduct is illegal in the both
the United States and the foreign nation where it occurred requires courts
to look for consent on the part of the foreign nation.3 74 When the DOJ is
bringing a claim, whether civilly or criminally, a court would look to see
if there was foreign cooperation and assistance. 375 The cooperation
would be evidence that the nation consented to the United States
adjudicating the matter, and, therefore, comity is satisfied because it
preserves mutual respect among nations. Absent that consent or implied
consent, however, a court would not apply the Sherman Act
extraterritorially.
Plaintiffs in civil matter-other than the DOJ-would have an
affirmative duty at the pleading stage to show that the principles of
comity are not offended by applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially. 376 They can do this through evidence of prior
cooperation or consent of a foreign nation for antitrust enforcement.
However, that foreign nation's cooperation must be in the same or
relatively similar industry.377 If plaintiffs cannot overcome this pleading
3 8
standard, the action would be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

373. See id.; Schimmel, supranote 369.
374. Cf Charles A. James, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address
Before the OECD Global Forum on Competition 8 (Oct. 17, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf) (discussing the importance of cooperative
relationships). Assistant Attorney General James, though, recognizes that this is "not a panacea for
every issue that arises out of the globalization of antitrust." Id.
375. For a discussion of how the DOJ coordinates international cooperation, see generally
ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ANTITRUST DtvIsIoN's INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

(2011), availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/intemational/program.pdf
376. For an example of a pleading standard that requires more than bare assertions, see
generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Twombly involved the pleading
requirements for stating a cognizable claim for a Sherman Act violation. Id. at 548-49. The Court
found that a plaintiff needed enough specifics in its complaint to make the cause of action
"plausible." Id. at 570. Like in Twombly, this standard would not require copious detail but enough
fact to support the proposition that this action does not offend comity.
377. Cf Brief for the Gov't of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)
(No. 91-1128) (describing that while the United Kingdom has cooperated with the United States in
the past, there have also been significant conflicts between the two nations).
378. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 822 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3. The Importance of a New Standard
A new standard for the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act rooted in prescriptive comity avoids the complications of balancing
tests. 379 It also can best placate the concerns of foreign nations. 38 0 Their
biggest concern is that U.S. antitrust laws unduly interfere with their
own ability to regulate their own markets. 38' The United States, though,
cannot simply bow to foreign concerns as the sole motivating factor for
action. 382 Instead, the United States, by using prescriptive comity, is
following established American jurisprudence and operating under
traditional canons of construction.383
C. An InternationalAntitrust Regime Is Impractical
An international antitrust regime is, in theory, a noble goal.384
However, as a practical matter, it is unrealistic given the different
antitrust goals nations have. 385 Those differences cannot be solved
through good-faith cooperation among nations.386 For example, the
United States and European Union strongly differ not only on
substantive antitrust law, but also on procedural antitrust law.3 87 Nations
also have different judicial processes and different views on fundamental
rights, such as due process.3 88 If nations individually enforce

379. See supratext accompanying notes 354-60.
380. See supraPart III.D.
381. See, e.g., Brief for the Gov't of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13-14, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) (No. 91-1128) (expressing concern that applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially would
impede the United Kingdom's ability to regulate its own industries).
382. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
the contention that foreign laws should shape U.S. law).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
384. See James, supra note 374, at 9 (supporting the Global Competition Network as a model
for global antitrust cooperation).
385. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1539 (1998). Canada, for example, does not just use antitrust laws to foster competition but also to
protect small business. Id.
386. See James, supra note 374, at 5-6. The United States and European Union reached
opposite decisions on the approval of the General Electric-Honeywell merger, despite cooperating
with each other. Id. at 5.
387. Waller, Internationalization,supra note 221, at 392. The U.S. approach is litigationbased, whereas the European Union's is administrative. Id. Most nations follow an administrative
antitrust regime and not a litigation-based regime. Id.
388.

See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,

AM.

BAR ASS'N,

INTERNATIONAL

ANTIRUST

COOPERATION HANDBOOK 2 (2004).
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international standards, there can be vastly different interpretations, and
that would defeat the purpose of an international antitrust regime.38 9 This
is likely, given
how domestic courts can sharply differ on the same
390
antitrust laws.
D. From Uncertainty to (More) Certainty
The new standard for the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act that operates through prescriptive comity can help to give foreign
corporations more certainty because it eliminates complicated and
imprecise balancing tests.391 When corporations are deciding whether to
pursue a transaction, they can be guided by objective factors to make a
well-informed decision to avoid their conduct giving rise to a cognizable
Sherman Act violation. Entering into foreign agreements and changing
the Restatement do not help to provide this certainty. Of course, no
standard can provide defendants with perfect certainty-short of exactly
complying with the Sherman Act for all foreign transactions.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is unimaginable that the American Banana Court could have
foreseen the dramatic expansion of the Sherman Act.392 Through the
effects test and the majority opinion in Hartford Fire, more and more
international conduct comes under the ambit of the Sherman Act.393
While the Supreme Court did recognize the importance of prescriptive
comity in Emagran, it failed to extend its usefulness to a common area
of antitrust enforcement: foreign conduct causing effects in the United
States.394 A once strictly territorial statute has, through the years, led to
international tensions, even between the United States and its closest
allies and trading partners. 395 The current state of the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act, if not changed through a new judicial
standard, will only cause further international tensions. 396 Requiring
courts to always recognize prescriptive comity is a practical solution that
can help to relieve some international tensions. 397 It will not dilute
389. John 0. McGinnis, The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalAntitrust Harmonization, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV 549,562 (2003).
390. Id at 562.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 354-60.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
393. See supra Part lf.B.
394. See supra Part III.C.
395. See supra Part lI.D.
396. See supratext accompanying notes 302-10.
397. See supra Part IV.B.
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antitrust enforcement, but will instead ensure that it is done in a manner
consistent with accepted international principles.398 As seen in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire, a comity-based antirust
system is consistent with accepted norms of international law that date
back to Justice Story.3 99 This system would appropriately recognize the
limits of U.S. laws.4 °°
Stephen D. Piraino*

398. See supra Part IV.D.
399. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013; Hofstra University School of Law; B.A, 2010; Boston College. I
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